What was once considered a fringe idea is increasingly testing the boundaries of mainstream European politics.
At the end of May, identitarian activists gathered in Porto, Portugal, for the second edition of the Remigration Summit. The event brought together key figures from the movement in Europe, Canada and the United States, including Austria’s Martin Sellner, Dutch Eva Vlaardingerbroek, Belgium’s Dries Van Langenhove, American Gregory Bovino and the local organiser, Afonso Gonçalves.
Too often, public debates label everything beyond the traditional right in conservative politics as “far right”. But this oversimplification obscures the ideological fragmentation within the right and prevents a more precise assessment of the risks that different actors pose to social cohesion.
Within this political spectrum, identitarians can be understood as the far right of the far right. Their core argument has evolved, but it now concentrates on one key demand: the restoration of ethno-cultural homogeneity in Europe.
While many right-wing parties in the EU justify tighter immigration controls through security concerns and focus on the deportation of undocumented and foreign criminals, identitarians go further.
They promote mass deportations regardless of a person’s legal status and, in some cases, argue that even legally settled, fully integrated, or native-born European citizens with immigrant backgrounds should be removed. This stems from the belief that such populations are incompatible with a vision of Europe as exclusively white, Western, and Christian.
The risks of face-washing
Like several far-right parties during the 2010s, the identitarian movement is now undergoing a process of face-washing. Its communication strategy now relies on its leaders having clean, disciplined and respectable public images.
The group has publicly “distanced” itself from the neo-Nazi groups that helped shape its ideological roots.
It also seeks intellectual legitimacy through initiatives such as the Institute for Remigration, which presents its arguments in an academic format. Rebranding is needed to normalise its ideas. The clearest example is the replacement of “mass deportation” with “remigration”, a term that suggests voluntary return while concealing the coercive logic behind their project.
Excluded from most mainstream media spaces, identitarians rely heavily on social media platforms such as X, Telegram and YouTube. Around them operates an online ecosystem of anonymous accounts that amplify their messages and circulate their content.
Most of their concerns focus on the alleged Islamisation of European public space, the demographic risks associated with migration and declines in birth rates, and the supposed medium- and long-term threat that ethnic and cultural replacement poses to coexistence and security.
Notably, online platforms also allow the stars of this movement to connect directly with audiences across age groups, although its base remains predominantly male. One notable development is its growing appeal among some gay male voters, a trend that recent research on the European “lavender vote” has begun to examine.
How much influence does the movement have?
The political influence of the identitarian movement varies across Europe, but its overall trajectory is upward.
The Porto summit showed that the movement is becoming increasingly embedded in pan-European networks, with links to established parties such as AfD (Germany), FPÖ (Austria), Vlaams Belang (Belgium), PVV (Netherlands) and activists from across Europe. In some cases, these parties already have a realistic path to government or direct influence over national policy.
In recent months, they have seen very encouraging trends in Germany, where the AfD managed to break what many considered the absolute ceiling of its public support, around 20 percent, and became the leading party, with national support approaching 30 percent. It achieved this while vocally supporting “remigration”.
In Britain, Reform UK has followed a similar path, becoming the party with the highest level of support. It is also proposing mass deportations.
And in practice, this agenda has now entered a new phase through the recently launched European Citizens’ Initiative, the Save Europe Act, which endorses the concept of remigration in Article 3 and had gathered 67,000 signatures by 1 June, and is promoted by people linked to the Remigration Summit.
The relationship between identitarians and other far-right parties can be described as symbiotic, but it remains complex. Yet both sides benefit from one another. One example is the support that Fidesz-linked spaces have given to identitarian figures such as Eva Vlaardingerbroek, including platforms such as CPAC Hungary and intellectual networks such as the Danube Institute.
Traditional far-right parties also benefit. Identitarian discourse is so radical in democratic Europe in 2026 that it makes the positions of the established far right appear more moderate, pragmatic and morally acceptable.
This matters in a European context where most governments are moving towards tighter controls on migration flows.
In the short term, the key question is how much traction remigration initiatives gain and whether they trigger a realignment of Europe’s right-wing landscape. Early signs suggest that members of the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament are divided on the issue, raising the prospect of internal fractures.
The outcome could shape whether remigration moves from the political fringe into the election platforms of anti-establishment parties across Europe. It will also test whether the issue becomes an electoral liability or a vote-winner for parties increasingly positioning themselves as governments-in-waiting.
Mainstream parties face their own dilemma. As remigration gains prominence, they will be forced to decide how to engage with parties and actors that embrace it, echoing the difficult debates in Germany over Alternative for Germany and where to draw the line between democratic competition and political extremism.
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